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We examine the protective effect of a tariff  in a small economy with uncer- 
tainty  and a  stock market in  which  shares of firms are traded.  In  a 
deterministic economy, the allocation of resources is governed by com- 
modity prices; in our economy, it is governed by equity prices and is 
dependent on commodity prices only to the extent that they influence 
equity prices. We  show that in  the  absence of international trade in 
securities a tariff need not protect the import competing sector. In the 
presence of international trade in securities, a tariff always protects the 
import competing sector. 
It is well known that in the standard deterministic two-sector economy the 
imposition of a tariff induces a resource  flow from the export industry to the 
import competing industry  if the external terms  of trade do not change. This 
is the small-country case. It is also known that in the large-country case, 
that is, in the case in which a country's import (export) volume influences 
its external terms of trade, an imposition of a tariff may induce a resource 
flow out of the import competing industry and into the export industry. 
This is known as the Metzler Paradox (see Metzler 1949). In the small- 
country case, the imposition of the tariff necessarily reduces the internal 
terms of trade because the external terms of trade do not change. Since 
domestic competitive-resource allocation is governed by the internal terms 
of trade, the deterioration in the internal terms of trade which follows the 
tariff leads to an expansion of the import competing industry and to a 
contraction of the export industry. Hence,  the tariff is protective in this 
case. In the large-country case, the imposition of a tariff may increase the 
external terms of trade at a rate which exceeds the rate of tariff, in which 
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case the internal terms of trade will improve, thereby reversing  the direction 
of resource  flow. If this happens, the tariff  is said to protect the export indus- 
try and not the import competing industry. 
It is the purpose of this paper to show that in the presence of uncertainty 
a tariff need not provide protection to the import competing industry even 
in the small-country case. The situation in which this may occur is one in 
which there is international trade in commodities but  no international 
trade in securities. If there is international trade in securities, a tariff does 
provide conventional protection. 
Our  analysis relies on  the  model developed in  Helpman  and  Razin 
(1978a, 1978b). In this model there is a stock market in which shares of 
firms are traded. The allocation of the factors of production is governed by 
equity prices and depends on commodity prices only to the extent that they 
influence equity prices. In the absence of international trade in securities, 
domestic equity prices are internally determined, since domestic risks are 
then fully borne by domestic residents. Now, the imposition of a tariff in a 
small country worsens necessarily the internal commodity terms of trade in 
every state of nature. However, its impact on relative equity prices, which 
determines the interindustry resource flow, depends on whether the tariff 
will shift the demand for equities toward the import competing sector or 
away from it. If tariff proceeds are not redistributed back to consumers, 
then the shift in the demand for equities is ambiguous. We provide an 
example in  which demand  shifts toward the  equities of the exportable 
industry; in  this case, the tariff does not protect the import competing 
industry. We also show that when tariff proceeds are redistributed back to 
consumers in the form of lump-sum transfers,  a "small" tariff protects the 
import competing industry if both goods are normal in consumption. (The 
difference between the two cases-with  and without tariff proceeds re- 
distribution-is  explained at the end of the example.) This contrasts with 
the deterministic small-country case in which the redistribution policy is 
not important for the protective effect of a tariff (it is important though for 
the large-country case). 
I.  The  Model 
Our small economy consists  of firms and consumers  who operate in an un- 
certain  environment  generated  by  random  production  technology  or 
random world prices. These random elements produce an incentive  to 
develop financial capital markets, whose existence-in  the form of stock 
markets-we  assume. Domestic financial capital markets  may or may not be 
integrated into the world's capital markets. If domestic capital markets are 
not integrated into the world's capital markets (i.e., there exists no inter- 
national trade in securities), they enable risk sharing only among domestic 
residents. However, if domestic capital markets are integrated into  the 
world's capital markets (i.e., there exists international trade in securities), PROTECTIVE  EFFECT  OF  A  TARIFF  II33 
they permit international risk sharing. Since we deal with international 
trade, we assume that there is international trade in commodities. 
Input decisions have to be made before the resolution of uncertainty. As 
a result, firms face random profits and cannot undertake profit maximiza- 
tion. Instead, we assume-following  Diamond  (1967)-that  firms choose 
their input levels so as to maximize their net value on the stock market; this 
procedure is  equivalent  to  profit maximization  whenever the  relevant 
random elements become degenerate (i.e., their value becomes known with 
certainty). After the resolution of uncertainty, returns are realized and 
distributed to the firm's final stockholders. 
Individuals play a double role in this economy. In the first  stage-before 
the resolution of uncertainty  individuals choose a portfolio by means of 
trading in the stock market. An equity in a firm entitles the stockholder to a 
share in the firm's random return. This share equals the inverse of the num- 
ber of the firm's outstanding equities. This is the stage in which individuals 
play the role of investors. 
In  the second stage-after  the resolution of uncertainty-individuals 
use the proceeds from portfolios to purchase commodities. This is the stage 
in which they play the role of consumers. 
Clearly, the two roles are interrelated. The ultimate goal of a portfolio 
chosen in the first stage is to provide consumption in the second stage. 
Hence, portfolio choice depends on preferences over consumption goods, 
but it also depends on probability beliefs, price expectations, and attitudes 
toward risk. 
Firms 
Consider a two-sector economy which produced two commodities, X1 and 
X2, by means of labor and capital. Each sector is composed of identical 
firms, and the output of each firm depends on its employment of capital and 
labor and on the state of nature that realizes. In particular, in every state a, 
where  a  =  1, 2,  . . . , S, the output  of firmj  is 
Qj(a)  =  Oj(a)fj(Lj,  Kj),  a  =  1, 2,  ...  ,  S  (1) 
where Oi =  a positive-valued random variable, fj(*)  =  a standard neo- 
classical linear homogeneous production function, Li =  labor input  in 
firmj, Kf =  capital input in firm,  and Qj =  output of firmj, which is also 
random. Since all firms in a given sector are identical andf/()  is linear 
homogeneous, equation (1) also describes the output of the sector to which 
firm  belongs if Lj and Kj are interpreted as total factor inputs in this sector. 
We use this aggregation procedure and from now on use sectors as the 
production units. The index  is used to denote sectors:j  =  1, 2. 
Assuming the existence of a stock market, it is explained in Helpman and 
Razin (1978a, 1978b) that by selling shares in the stock market a firm in 
sector j can be viewed  as selling real equities of type j,  where one real II34  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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equity of type  provides the bundle [Oj(1), Oj(2),  .  .  .,  Oj(S)]  of commodity 
Xj. The output of real equities of type j  by industry j  is Zj = fj(Lj, Kj), 
and we can draw a transformation curve between real equities  TT  in 
figure 1. The curve  TT has all the usual characteristics of a Heckscher- 
Ohlin type transformation  curve. 
It  was shown in  Helpman  and Razin  (1978a, 1978b) that, given  the 
relative price of type 2 real equities q0  (q0  is the price of type 2 real equities 
divided by the price of type 1 real equities), net-value-maximizing firms 
choose in an equilibrium a point on the transformation  curve TT at which 
the MRT  (marginal rate of transformation)  between Z2 and Z, is equal to 
q0. Hence, given q0,  production of real equities takes place at point P0 in 
figure 1. Corresponding to point P0, there is an equilibrium wage rate and 
rental rate on capital and an equilibrium allocation of the fixed supplies of 
labor and capital between the sectors. Given PF, the output of commodities 
is not uniquely determined; it depends on the state of nature. If state a 
realizes, the output of commodity i will be Oj(c.)4, i =  1, 2. 
By varying q along  TT,  we trace out the general equilibrium supply 
functions: 
Zj =  Zj(q),  j=1,  2.  (2) 
Clearly, for q which does not result in complete specialization, Z2(*)  is an 
increasing function of q (i.e., Z  [q] >  0), and Z  ( ) is a decreasing  function 
of q (i.e., Z[q]  <  0). In addition, 
Z?(q) +  qZ2(q)  -  ?.  (3) PROTECTIVE  EFFECT  OF  A  TARIFF  I I35 
Consumers 
Let v(p, I) be the representative consumer's  indirect utility function, where 
p is the price of X2 in terms of X1 and I is income in terms of X1. All consu- 
mers are assumed to be identical. Then, it is shown in Helpman and Razin 
(1978b, eq. [7]) that the consumer's portfolio choice is in equilibrium: 
max  Ev[p(a), 01(a)zl  +  p(*)02(*)Z2], 
Z1,Z2  >  0  (4) 
subject  to zi  +  q'z2 <  Z1  (q0) +  qZ2  (q), 
where zi is the purchase of type i real equities and E is the expectations 
operator based on subjective probability beliefs. Commodity prices, which 
may be state dependent, p(a), are assumed to be given to our small country. 
It is assumed in equation (4) that individuals know the price ratio p(a)  in 
every state (i.e., their price expectations are correct) but that they do not 
know which state will realize. 
Assuming risk aversion, we can draw a set of assets-indifference  curves 
convex to the origin, where an assets-indifference curve is defined as all 
combinations of (z1, Z2)  for which the expected utility is constant. Then, 
the solution to equation  (4)  can be represented by  the tangency of an 
assets-indifference  curve to an assets-budget line, like point E'  in figure 1. 
The  curve  U0U0  represents here the highest affordable expected utility 
level. Observe that points P0 and E'  in figure 1 represent an equilibrium 
in which there is international trade in equities and in which the rest of the 
world produces a perfect substitute for domestic type 2 real equities, which 
are imported. If there is no international trade in equities, the equilibrium 
domestic relative price q will be such as to make zi  =  Zi(q), i =  1, 2. Such 
an equilibrium is represented in figure 2 by point P at which an assets- 
indifference curve is tangent to the transformation  curve. Notice, however, 
that we  are still assuming international trade in  commodities after the 
realization of a state of nature at the prevailing world prices p(a). 
At this point, the reader should note that the assets-indifference  curves 
depend on the distribution of relative commodity prices. A shift in the price 
distribution pivots the entire assets-indifference  map. 
II.  Protection  under  Uncertainty 
Consider an ad valorem tariff on the second commodity, assuming that the 
second commodity is imported in every state of nature. The effect of the 
tariffon the allocation of resources  between the two sectors  differs  according 
to whether international trade in securities takes place. We begin with the 
case of no international trade in securities, in which domestic residents bear 
all domestic risks. I I36  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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A.  No International  Trade  in Securities 
The tariff-inclusive assets-indifference  curves (which, along with the pro- 
duction possibilities curve, help determine the economy's production) are 
given by 
Ev[(l  +  t)p(c); 01(a)zI  +  (1 +  t)P(0)02(a)Z2  (5) 
+  T (a, t)]  =  constant, 
where t =  the tariff rate (assumed to be state independent) and T(a,  t)  = 
state a expected lump-sum transfer  payments. If tariff proceeds are redistri- 
buted back to consumers, T(x,  t)  is assumed to equal tariff proceeds in 
state  a.  The  consumer  treats  T(a, t)  as  a  state-dependent  lump-sum 
transfer;  he does not relate it to the volume of imports,  just like in the deter- 
ministic model. If tariff proceeds are not redistributed, T(a,  t) equals zero 
in every state of nature. This is the relevant case if, for example, the govern- 
ment uses tariff proceeds in order to purchase commodities. (If the govern- 
ment's spending is related to the provision of public goods, our analysis is 
unaltered if we assume that the direct utility function is additively separable 
in private and public goods.)  In the small-country deterministic case, a 
tariff protects the import competing industry independently of the way in 
which the tariff revenue is disposed of. In the present framework  this is not 
so, which makes our distinction between the two extreme cases of the use of 
tariff revenue relevant. PROTECTIVE  EFFECT  OF  A  TARIFF  1I37 
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The  tariff-inclusive  marginal  rate  of substitution  (MRS)  between  real 
equity  2 and  real equity  1 is given  by 
MRS(z1,  z2; t) 
E(1  +  t)p(00)02(cL)v[(l  +  t)p(a)  ;01(a)z1  +  (1 +  t)P(x)02(a)Z2  +  T(a,t  ] 
E01(ci)v1[(l +  t)P(0);O01(a)zI  +  (1 +  t)p(a)02(0)z2  +  T(a,,t)] 
(6) 
Let us start with  a discussion  of the case in which  tariff proceeds  are not 
distributed  back  to consumers.  In  this  case,  individuals  choose  a portfolio 
expecting  (correctly)  no transfers after the realization  of a state of nature. 
T(oc, t)  =  0 for all  t and at =  1, 2,  . . . , S.  (7) 
From  equations  (6)  and  (7)  it is readily  verified  that  a change  in the  tariff 
rate twists the assets-indifference  curves at every point  (zl,  z 2)  and changes 
the  MRS  between  real  equities  2 and  1. This  is because  the  tariff changes 
the mean as well as higher  moments  (such as the variance)  of the distribution 
of the relative  internal  price of good  2. 
In  figure  3,  point  g  denotes  the  pretariff  stock  market  equilibrium  in 
which  the pretariff  assets-indifference  curve  U0U0 is tangent  to the produc- 
tion possibilities  curve  TT.  If the posttariff  assets-indifference  curve,  which 
passes through  the initial  point  El', is steeper  than  U0  U0, as U1 U1, the new 
equilibrium  must  be at a point  on  TT  to the right  of E:;  that  is, resources I I38  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
will move away from sector 1 and into the import competing sector, sector 
2-the  standard case.  If  the  posttariff assets-indifference curve  which 
passes through E: is flatter than U0U0,  as U2U2,  the new equilibrium will 
be at a point on TT to the left of E:; that is, resources  will move away from 
the importable goods sector and into the exportable goods sector. In the 
second case, a tariff does not protect the import competing sector, contrary 
to the deterministic case. 
In order to see the factors which influence the "twist" in the assets- 
indifference curves, we derive the expression  for the derivative of the assets' 
marginal rate of substitution evaluated at a zero tariff rate. Differentiating 
the right-hand side of equation (6), using equation (7), and evaluating the 
result at t =  0, we obtain 
DMRS(z1, Z2;  0)  =  MRS 
EvI(c)p(Oc)  {-C2I  ()  +  [C2(c()  -02(0)Z2]  VII(0)/VI(00  I 
+  I  [P(CX)02(c')  -  MRSO1(o)]  (8) 
Ev1  (a)01 (a) 
where c2 is consumption of the second good, C2I  is the derivative of c2 with 
respect to income, and VII is the derivative of vs with respect to income. 
Variables which are state dependent are followed by an a in brackets.  Thus, 
c2(c*)  is consumption of good 2 in state a. We have omitted in equation (8) 
functional representations  of variables in order to gain clarity. 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (8) represents  the direct 
effect of a tariff on the assets MRS. This effect is positive, implying that the 
direct effect is always protective. The second term summarizes the indirect 
effects which stem from changes in the marginal utility of income in every 
state of nature. The tariff affects the marginal utility of income via two 
routes: a direct income effect which arises  from an increase in the return on 
type 2 real equities and a conventional price effect. The indirect effects are 
quite complicated,  and they depend on marginal propensities to spend, 
import volumes, attitudes toward risk, etc. (Observe that -vII[C]/v1Ij[a]  is 
the absolute measure of risk aversion, and  c2[a]  -  02[a]Z2  equals imports 
if we evaluate eq. [8] at the initial equilibrium point at which Z2  =  Z2-) 
The question that arises is whether the net indirect effect can be negative 
and sufficiently large in absolute value so as to outweigh the positive direct 
effect. The answer to this question is in the affirmative, as shown by the 
following example. 
Example 
Let the utility function be u  =  log (c2 +  log c1). This yields the indirect 
utility  function  v =  log {[I/(l  +  t)p]  -  1 +  log [(1  +  t)p]},  where  I 
stands  for the consumer's  disposable income in terms of good 1. This implies PROTECTIVE EFFECT OF A TARIFF  II39 
(using eqq. [6] and [7]) that MRS  (z1, Z2; t)  {E[01 (x) (I +  t) -  p(oc) 
Z1 +  02(0)Z2  -  1 +  log (1  +  t)p  ()'  02 (a)}/E01  (a)  (1 +  t)  p(a)  zl 
+  O2()zZ2-1  +  log (1 +  t)p(9)f-10Q(x)(l  +  t)-'p(cx).  Assume  now 
that 02(CX)  =  1 for all a,p(cx)  =  1 for all a, 01((a) >  1 for all a, and that at 
the initial equilibrium  to =  0 and z'  =  Zo  =  1. Since  for  to =  0 we have 
c1c =  p(a)  =  l,  the assumption 01(a)  >  1 assures that good 1 is initially 
exported and good 2 imported in all states. The stockholders'  choice of these 
real equity holdings can be assured  by an appropriate choice of production 
technologies and factor endowments. Then,  the derivative of MRS with 
respect to t, evaluated at the initial equilibrium, is  (see eq.  [8])  OMRS 
(zo, zo  t?)10t  = E[l/01(cx)]  -  {E[l01  (aX)]2  -  [E  l/01(c)]2}  =  E[1/01(ac)] 
-var  [1/01  (a) ], where var stands for variance. Thus, E [  I/01(a)]  =  MRS 
is the direct effect, while  -var  [l/01(a)]  is the net indirect effect. Clearly, 
the net indirect effect is negative, and it dominates the direct effect for 
sufficiently large variances of I/01(ca).  Hence, for var [l/01(a)],  sufficiently 
large 8MRS(zo, zo; to)/at  <  0, implying that, for a "small" tariff, U2U2 in 
figure 3 is the posttariff  assets-indifference  curve. Therefore, in this case, the 
imposition of the tariff leads to a contraction of the import competing 
industry and an expansion of the export industry. 
In the absence of uncertainty, the variance of 1/01  (a) is zero, and the 
paradoxical result does not arise. In the presence of uncertainty, the para- 
doxical result can arise because of the negative effect that an increase in t 
has on the demand for type 2 real equities, holding their returns constant. 
This can be seen as follows. Write the indirect utility function as v =  log 
{0l(X)(I  +  t)-1Z1  +  Z2  -  1  +  B(t)}, where B(t) = log (1 +  t).  It  can  be 
shown that an increase in B reduces the demand for type 2 real equities. 
Now, an increase in the tariff rate has two effects. It increases B, resulting 
in a decline in the demand for type 2 real equities, and increases the return 
on type 2 real equities, resulting in an increase in their demand. The first 
effect dominates when var [l/01 (a))]  is sufficiently large. 
Consider now the case in which tariff proceeds are redistributed back to 
consumers. In this case, state cx  transfers  (i.e., the tariff rate x  the value of 
imports) are implicitly given by 
T (a,  t)  tp(Yx)  {C2[(  1  +  t)p(CX); 01 (Y)Z1  +  (1  +  t)02(cx)p(0t)z2  (9) 
+  T(cx,  t)]  -  2(Y)Z2[q(t)]j, 
where c2(*)  =  the second commodity demand function, O2(x)Z2(*)  = 
the local output of good 2 in state a, and q(t) is the equilibrium relative price 
ofreal equity 2 which is a function of the tariffrate. Notice that from equation 
(9), we get 
T(cx,  0)  =  0, 
eT(cx,0)  = p(x){C2[P(cX);01(cx)Z1  +  O2(x)p(c)Z2] -  O2(0)02(q)}.  at I  140  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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That is, a zero tariff rate gives rise to a zero amount of tariff proceeds, and 
the rate of change in the tariff proceeds for a small tariff is equal to imports 
evaluated  at  world prices.  Individuals  choose a  portfolio expecting  to 
receive a lump-sum transfer of  T(ci, t)  in state a,  a  =  1, 2, . . . , S (they 
are not aware of the relationship given in eq. [9]). 
Now we show that if both goods are normal the paradoxical result cannot 
appear in the case of a small tariff. In order to see this, differentiate equation 
(6) with respect to t and evaluate it at t =  0, using equation (10), to obtain 
aMRS(z1,  Z2;  0)/at  =  lEv (a)  0(a) ]  I&(a)P(a)02  (a)  +  EvIP(a) 
[p(X)]2O2(0  )  +  EvI1(a)[p(X)]2C2(a)02(()  -  MRS(z1,  Z2;  0)  [EvIp(a)p(a) 
O(0)  +EvII(0)p(oX)c2  (Q)01(a)]},  where  vIp is  the  derivative  of VI  with  re- 
spect to its first argument. 
Since  VIp  =  VPI  =  ( -VI6C2)/5I  =  VIIC2  VIC2  and  PC2I  1  C-  j 
we  can substitute these relationships in  the above expression to obtain 
aMRS(z1,  Z2; 0)/at  =  [IlEv(a)01(a)][EvI(a)p(o)02(L)C1I  (L  +  MRS(z1, 
Z2;  0)EvI(a)0(X)p(a)c2I(a)].  If  both  goods  are  normal,  the  marginal 
propensities to spend on  them are positive and the above expression is 
positive. This means that for normal goods a small tariff will  twist the 
assets-indifference  curves in figure 3 so as to make them steeper, like from 
U0U0  to U1  U1 and thus provide protection to the importable goods sector. 
Finally, observe that an equity subsidy-i.e.,  a subsidy given to an indus- 
try at the financing stage -will  unambiguously induce the expansion of that 
industry. In figure 4 we reconstruct the initial equilibrium shown in figure 
3, the real equity-price ratio being q. A subsidy to sales of real equity 2 
decreases to q' the relative price of real equity 2 to investors and drives a PROTECTIVE  EFFECT  OF  A  TARIFF  I  14I 
wedge between that relative price and the marginal rate of transformation 
q"f, leading to a new equilibrium Es. In this case, resources  will move away 
from sector 1 and into sector 2. 
B.  International  Trade  in Securities 
Now consider the case in which the economy trades with the outside world 
in  both  commodities  and  securities. By  the  small-country assumption, 
without a tariff, commodity prices and security prices are given to the home 
country. A tariff  raises  the local price of the importable goods, but how does a 
tariff affect the importable-good industry's stock market value? It is ex- 
plained in Helpman and Razin (1978b) that a tariff at a rate of lOOt  per- 
cent, which increases the price of the second commodity by lOOt  percent 
in every state of nature, increases by l  OOt  percent the return on each unit of 
domestic type 2 real equities. This will result in a lOOt  percent increase in 
the price of  local  type  2  real equities in  order to  eliminate  profitable 
arbitrage. The local type 2 real equity provides a return  of (1 +  t) 02  (a)P(a) 
in state a while the foreign type 2 real equity provides a return of 02 (a)  p(a) 
in state a. Hence, one unit of a local type 2 real equity is now equivalent to 
(1 +  t) units of foreign type 2 real equities. This means that the price of 
local type 2 real equities increases from q to (1 +  t) q. Thus, following a 
tariff, resources will  move  necessarily away  from the  exportable-good 
industry and into the importable-good industry, as in the deterministic 
case. 
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